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Abstract

Courts struggle to deal with evidence relating to the
existence of karst terrain and the impact of human
activities on karst terrain. Although courts often must
hear cases involving complex scientific issues, karst
seems to prove especially problematic, perhaps because
of the lack of uniformity and the site-specific nature of
the resource.
Helping Others Maintain Environmental Standards
(HOME) v. Bos, 406 Ill.App.3d 669, 941 N.E.2d 347
(2010) (“Bos”), represents the most extreme example
of a court struggling with evidence relating to karst
matters. The court found against the plaintiffs, primarily
because the expert witness admitted that additional
testing could have been done, but was not, due in part
to financial constraints. One legal treatise referred to
the defense’s “relentless theme of studies not done” as
“raging, fuming, “it’s-all-an-environmental-conspiracy”
presentation (Rogers Environmental Law, 2d., Section
4:18). This case explicitly raises the questions that many
others implicitly raise. How many studies are enough?
Which studies are sufficient?
The Bos case and a variety of other published opinions
involve courts analyzing expert testimony as to karst
matters and determining whether such evidence is
sufficient. Examination of these cases proves useful
for future litigants and experts. The cases examined
involve a variety of situations, including Environmental
Impact Assessments and various citizen challenges
to development. The review reveals that courts apply
inconsistent standards and then use inconsistent analysis
in the application. Some of the inconsistency can be
explained by the context of the case, while others cannot.
Analysis of the court cases indicate that courts are
generally ill-equipped to deal with expert testimony
related to karst matters and that this testimony may prove
to be more problematic than other technical, scientific
evidence due to the nature of karst as a heterogeneous
resource depending upon site-specific studies and
examination. This circumstance further raises the issue
of the cost of expert testimony relating to karst in court
cases and whether karst investigations should instead
be conducted by state or federal agencies. However, if
these agencies should conduct the investigations, do the
agencies have adequate resources to do so?

The paper recommends that the scientific karst
community further educate lawyers, judges and
citizens on the scientific aspects of karst, including the
heterogeneous nature of karst. Ultimately, however,
expert witnesses in karst matters will be forced to
incorporate education of the court into their reports and
testimony, to the extent that the court allows.

Introduction

Courts struggle to understand increasingly complex and
technical expert testimony in a broad range of cases.
However, nowhere is this struggle more evident than
with respect to expert testimony related to karst. In 2010,
a state court in Illinois decided a case that drew national
attention for the court’s extraordinary comments on
expert witness testimony on a karst issue. The context of
the case raises a number of issues on expert testimony,
including how courts should evaluate the testimony,
who should pay for expert testimony and whether
experts must conduct every test possible. Examination
of this case, along with the handful of additional court
cases in the United States that evaluate expert testimony
on karst, yields some basic principles that should guide
expert witnesses and litigants in karst matters.

The Nature of Expert Testimony

The Federal Rules of Evidence set forth the guidelines
for qualification as an expert witness and for evaluation
of expert witness testimony in federal courts. An
expert qualifies by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education (Federal Rules of Evidence Rule
702). Opinions expressed must meet the following
requirements: (1) the expert’s scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and, (4) the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case Federal
Rules of Evidence Rule 702). An expert may base their
opinion on facts and data personally observed or facts
and data the witness has been made aware of (Federal
Rules of Evidence Rule 703).
Rules that apply in most state courts are either based on
or similar to the Federal Rules. Judges have fairly broad
discretion in applying the rules.
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Another issue that proves important in understanding
these issues involve the relationship between trial courts
and appellate courts. Trial courts find the facts and then
apply the law to the facts to make rulings. If a jury is
seated, the jury finds the facts and the court instructs the
jury on the law to apply. If no jury sits, the judge in the
trial court finds the facts and applies the law. Appellate
courts hear legal arguments and generally do not hear
witnesses or admit additional evidence.
Therefore, appellate courts generally defer to the trial
court, or the court that hears the testimony, on facts.
Facts include judgements about expert testimony.
The trial court is held to an “arbitrary and capricious”
standard on factual issues. With respect to legal issues,
the appellate court generally owes no deference to the
trial court and may apply the law as the appellate court
interprets the law.

An Illinois Case Creates Uncertainty
for Expert Testimony
Introduction

In Helping Others Maintain Environmental Standards
v. Bos, 406 Ill.App.3d 669, 941 N.E.2d 347 (2010)
(“Bos”), a citizen group (HOMES) filed suit against
the developer of a large dairy facility and the Illinois
Department of Agriculture to prevent the construction
of the dairy. The citizen’s group had an employee of the
Illinois State Geological Survey, who was not paid by
HOMES, testify as an expert witness on their behalf. The
trial court ultimately ruled against HOMES. The case
was appealed by HOMES. Most importantly for this
analysis, the appellate court approved the trial court’s
holding that HOMES did not meet the requirements to
obtain a permanent injunction.
Specifically, HOMES needed to demonstrate a high
probability of groundwater contamination from the
dairy. HOMES has an employee of the Illinois State
Geological Survey testify as to the high probability.
Bos’ expert witnesses testified otherwise. The trial court
found that HOMES failed to prove the high probability
of groundwater contamination. The appellate court ruled
that the trial court finding was reasonable and upheld the
finding.

Facts of the Case

Bos proposed to build two large dairies, each of which
would hold 6,850 animal units in the form of dairy
cows and calves. One of the facilities would have
three livestock waste holding ponds. To move forward,
Bos needed approval from the Illinois Department of
Agriculture. Eight siting requirements must be met to
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receive approval under the Illinois Livestock Act. The
requirements ask whether:
(1) registration and livestock waste management plan
certification requirements were met by the notice of
intent to construct;
(2) the design, location, or proposed operation would
protect the environment by being consistent with the
Livestock Act;
(3) the location minimized incompatibility with the area’s
character by being zoned for agriculture or complying
with the Livestock Act’s setback requirements;
(4) the facility was in a 100–year flood plain or an
environmentally sensitive area and, if so, whether the
proposed construction standards were consistent with
protecting the area’s safety;
(5) the owner or operator submitted plans to minimize
the likelihood of environmental damage from spills,
runoff, and leaching;
(6) odor control plans were reasonable and incorporated
odor reduction technologies;
(7) traffic patterns minimized the effect on existing
traffic flow; and
(8) construction of the facility was consistent with
community growth, tourism, recreation, or economic
development through compliance with applicable
zoning and setback requirements.
(510 ILCS 77/ 12(d)).
Requirement (4), which provides for heightened
construction standards in karst areas, formed the focus
of the case and the expert testimony. “Environmentally
sensitive area” includes a karst area or an area with
aquifer material within five feet of the bottom of the
waste facility. Much of the dispute focused on whether
the proposed facility was in a “karst area”. The lawsuit
alleged that the bedrock underlying the proposed facility
and in the area of the facility consisted of Galena
Group Carbonate Rock with karst features. These
geologic conditions make the groundwater in the area
highly susceptible to contamination according to the
allegations. Specifically, the claims of HOMES centered
on the issue of whether the waste containment pond
liners were inadequately designed because the design
failed to consider the karst terrain.

Karst Areas and Location of Livestock
Waste Handling Facilities

The Illinois Livestock Act defines “karst area” as “an area
with a land surface containing sinkholes, large springs,
disrupted land drainage, and underground drainage
systems associated with karstified carbonate bedrock
and caves or a land surface without those features but
containing a karstified carbonate bedrock unit generally
overlain by less than 60 feet of unconsolidated materials”
(510 ILCS 77/10.24). “Karstified carbonate bedrock”
is defined as “a carbonate bedrock unit (limestone or
dolomite) that has a pronounced conduit or secondary
porosity due to dissolution of the rock along joints,
fractures, or bedding plains” (510 ILCS 77/10.26).
Under administrative regulations, if the “proposed
livestock waste handling facility is to be located within
an area designated as ‘Sink hole areas’ on ‘Karst Terrains
and Carbonate Rocks of Illinois’, IDNR–ISGS Illinois
Map 8”2, or if soil samples from within 20 feet of the
livestock waste handling facility boundaries indicate that
the waste handling facility is in a “karst area,” additional
inspections and tests are required (35 Ill. Adm. Code §§
506.302(b), (g)). If a livestock waste handling facility
is in a karst area, the waste facility must be designed to
prevent seepage of waste into groundwater (510 ILCS
77/13(b)(2); 35 Ill. Adm.Code § 506.312(a)) and is to
be constructed using a rigid material such as concrete or
steel (35 Ill. Adm.Code § 506.312(b)).
However, the facility’s owner or operator may receive
the Department’s permission to “modify or exceed
these standards in order to meet site specific objectives”
(35 Ill. Adm. Code § 506.312(c)). In such a situation,
the owner or operator must demonstrate that the
modification is at least as protective of the groundwater,
surface water, and structural integrity of the waste
facility as are the regulation’s requirements (35 Ill. Adm.
Code § 506.312(c)). No livestock waste facility may be
constructed within 400 feet of a natural depression in a
karst area (510 ILCS 77/13(b)(2); 35 Ill. Adm.Code §
506.302(g)(1)).

The Expert Testimony

The trial turned on the expert witnesses on each side.
HOMES relied mainly on evidence presented by Samuel
Panno. Panno is a senior scientist with the Illinois
State Geological Survey. The state Attorney General’s
Office originally asked Panno to get involved in the
case, presumably on behalf of the state (Bos, 374). The
Attorney General’s Office later changed their mind and
decided that the state should not be involved (Ibid).

Panno testified that karstified carbonate bedrock was
“a crucial component of [HOME’s] case” (Bos, 374).
Panno admitted that he failed to make a site-specific
investigation. He based his opinion on LiDAR imagery,
examination of aerial photos and field investigations. The
testimony indicated that Panno used LiDAR imagery to
locate fractures in the carbonate rock. One lineament
underlain a waste holding pond, but Panno admitted that
lineaments are an interpretative tool to indicate where
to look for further information. One photo appeared to
show a spring, but Panno admitted that he could not
definitely identify the feature as a spring. The testimony
failed to tie his findings directly to the site of the waste
holding ponds, with the information mainly coming
from outside the site (Ibid).
Panno similarly testified that elevated levels of sodium
chloride could indicate susceptibility of the karst aquifer,
but admitted that similar levels had been found in nonkarst areas. His investigation failed to include testing of
wells near the dairy for bacteria. Panno admitted that
such tests were a “good idea” to detect a connection
between septic systems and the wells (Ibid).
Panno testified that Bos should have measured stream
flow, performed groundwater chemistry evaluation,
installed monitoring wells and conducted dye tracing, but
he failed to take the same steps (Bos, 374). He admitted
that a site-specific analysis would most appropriately
determine the characteristics of the site. Panno also
called into question the testimony of another expert
who had suggested that the presence of weathered or
highly weathered limestone in rock corings and borings
indicated karstic bedrock. Panno stated that not all such
bedrock is karstified carbonate bedrock.
The trial court also seemed to place great weight on
Panno’s admission that a number of additional tests
could have been conducted to provide more definitive
indications of whether karst terrain underlain the
proposed dairy site. Specifically, Panno did not evaluate
groundwater chemistry, conduct well monitoring or use
dye tracing. Panno failed to take these steps due to cost
(Ibid). The State Geological Survey had few resources
and so various tests were not done (Bos, 375). He did
not ask HOMES to fund the studies because that is
“not something we do” (Ibid). The state funding was so
limited that staff would “drive 10 hours round trip and do
10 hours of fieldwork in one day because there was no
money to stay overnight in a hotel” (Ibid).
However, no rock corings from the site were examined
and no bacterial well data from the area were sought.
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These tests would not be prohibitively expensive (Bos,
374). The court characterized HOMES’ evidence as
“vague” as to specific contaminants, concentrations and
release mechanisms (Ibid).
The court placed greater weight on the evidence presented
the expert witnesses for Bos. The court favorably cited
the regional and site-specific investigations, including
examination of rock corings and well data. The Bos
experts concluded that the area was not karst and that
facility design was sufficient to protect groundwater
(Ibid). Bos also argued that certain information that
Panno failed to disclose at the trial for the preliminary
injunction entitled them to damages (Ibid).

Conclusions

Commentators reacted incredulously to the standard
that the Bos case appeared to set. “The defense puts on
a raging, fuming, “it’s-all-an-environmental-conspiracy”
presentation, and the court sits there meekly, absorbing
every word of it. The relentless theme of studies
not done…is of course the stuff of routine crossexamination” (Rodgers and Burleson, Section 4.18).
The fact that Panno, a civil servant, served as the expert
witness for the citizen group also raises the issue of
whether state or federal agencies should provide neutral
expert testimony. In addition, the case raises the question
of whether “the “studies not done” should be assigned to
the citizens or undertaken by the authorities themselves”
(Ibid). However, if state or federal agencies should serve
as experts for the courts, significant additional funding
needs to be provided.

Other Karst Expert Testimony Cases
Introduction

A handful of other published court opinions also address
the standards for expert testimony in cases where karst
plays an important role. These cases appear in a variety
of contexts. Although none of the cases present holdings
as dramatic or far-reaching as Bos, the opinions,
cumulatively, present guidelines that expert witnesses
and litigants should heed in future cases

Terpstra v. Peterson 1999 WL 289283 (Ct.
App. Minn. 1999)

Terpstra challenged the approval of a conditional use
permit for a covered hog feedlot and alleged that the
granting of the permit was arbitrary and capricious.
(Terpstra, 1). Terpstra contended that an Environmental
Assessment Worksheet should have been completed.
However, the Rice County Board of Commissions
determined that an EAW was not necessary and voted
to approve the permit. Terpstra presented maps from the
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Geological Atlas of Rice County that indicated that the
proposed feedlot would be in an area with a moderate
risk of karst. (Terpstra, 3).
The board questioned the accuracy of the information,
noting that the conclusions were based only on
topographical features and that no soil samples or wells
samples were collected or analyzed (Ibid). The board
concluded that “no evidence exists which suggests that
Far-Gaze Farms’ proposal would endanger the health,
safety and welfare of the county’s citizens.” (Terpstra,
3).
The court found that while the evidence may not have
significant probative value, the evidence “suggests”
that karst exists in the area. (Ibid). Therefore, the
proposal may endanger the health, safety and welfare
of the county’s citizens. However, the court upheld
the approval of the permit. Terpstra failed to present
evidence on the accuracy of the Geological Survey maps,
the degree of danger presented by karst or how likely
sinkhole formation is in a karst area (Ibid). No evidence
on the record showing the relationship between a “karst
problem” and public health and safety (Ibid).

Olmsted County Concerned Citizens
v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency,
2010 WL 4941663 (Ct. App. Minn. 2010)
(unpublished)

The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
decided not to require an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for a proposed ethanol facility. Olmsted
County Concerned Citizens (OCCC) filed suit, claiming
that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and not
supported by the evidence. Public comments on the
draft Environmental Assessment Worksheet included
concerns about the karst geological features, data and
modeling methodologies, and spills and emergency
responses. (Olmsted County Concerned Citizens, 1).
After a public hearing before the MPCA Citizen’s Board
(the “Board”), the Board delayed its decision and asked
the MPCA to prepare a set of findings that would require
a limited-scope EIS on several issues including surface
water and groundwater interactions in karst geological
areas and the adequacy of a 30-day pump test to predict
the quantity and quality of water in the karst geological
areas (Ibid, 2). At a second hearing, after receiving further
information, the MPCA Citizen’s Board determined that
the proposed ethanol plant did not have the potential for
significant environmental effects and voted unanimously
that an EIS was not required. OCCC filed suit.

With respect to dye tracing tests, the MPCA maintained
that the tests were not needed because of the groundwater
protection provided by the design of the plant. In addition,
no open or free draining karst features exist on the
property to allow the introduction of dyes. Furthermore,
the “intensive site investigations and geophysics work” at
the site vitiated the need for dye tracing (Olmsted County
Concerned Citizens, 4). As for leaks and spills in light of
karst geology, the court found that the record contained
significant information indicating that the site contained
few karst characteristics. If fractures or cavities in the
bedrock were encountered in the excavation stage, plans
were in place to address the issues (Ibid, 10). Based
on the evidence, the decision was not arbitrary and
capricious and was backed by substantial evidence.

Karst Environmental Education and
Protection, Inc. v. Federal Highway
Administration, 2011 WL 5301589 (U.S. Dist.
Ct., W.D. Kentucky 2011)

Karst Environmental Education and Protection, Inc.
(KEEP) challenged the adequacy of the geologic survey
relied on by the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) as “cursory”. (Karst Environmental Education
and Protection, 18). The group argued the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires an in-depth
karst analysis, including dye tracing and computer
modeling of groundwater (Hoosier Envtl. Council, 1).
The study here failed to discuss karst topography “as a
whole”, focusing only on the largest caves and sinkholes.
(Karst Environmental Education and Protection, 18).
KEEP also faulted the method by which the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) tabulated the
biological impact on the caves. The FEIS measured
the distance from the Project area to the mouth of the
cave. KEEP maintained that, given the speed by which
groundwater could move, proximity to the cave opening
is immaterial. The network of underground streams and
passageways are much closer to the project.
The court rejected the arguments, citing the relative scale
and impact of the project in this case and the project in
Hoosier Envtl. The project at issue creates a connector
road 3.8 miles long, whereas Hoosier Envtl involved
a highway of over 140 miles. (Karst Environmental
Education and Protection, 19). While acknowledging
that the agency “could have” done more, the court
found that the FHWA took the required “hard look” at
the kart issues, finding that the review was proportionate
to the size of the action. (Ibid). “[P]racticability and
reasonableness must be taken into account…to preserve
the values and amenities of the natural environment”
(Envtl. Defense Fund, 468).

In re Louisiana Energy Services, LP, 2010
WL 3969642 (Ct. App. New Mexico 2010)

Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping
(CARD) objected to the granting of a groundwater
discharge permit to Louisiana Energy Services, LP
(Louisiana Energy). CARD appealed a ruling of the
lower court that, among other things, found that CARD’s
proffered expert witness did not qualify as an expert on
the matter before the court.
The expert, Dr. Richard Phillips, testified that he had a
Ph.D. in geomorphology and that CARD had retained
him seventeen days earlier to investigate the ground
water hydrology in the immediate vicinity of the site (In
re Louisiana Energy Services, LP, 1). Phillips submitted
a report about karst aquifers at the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, sixty to seventy miles from the
Louisiana Energy site. Based on a field investigation he
conducted north of the Louisiana Energy site, Phillips
concluded that the Louisiana Energy site was in a karst
region.
Phillips based his finding primarily on a structural
depression that holds water ephemerally, and Baker
Spring, which holds water perennially. Phillips testified
that the depression and Baker Spring were “telltale
features of a karst terrain.” His testimony indicated that
the karstic formation would likely be affected by runoff
from the site. Phillips admitted that he had spent only
one day in the field to support his findings and that he
failed to visit the Louisiana Energy site (Ibid).
Expert witnesses for Louisiana Energy contradicted
Phillips’s testimony, asserting that the karst-like features
observed by Phillips could have been caused by human
activity. (In re Louisiana Energy Services, LP, 2) These
witnesses concluded that no karst existed on the site, that
Baker spring was not related to the site and evidence of
karst on the site would not affect the viability of their
operations on the site due to the hydrology in the area,
and the practices and protections on the site.
The trial court concluded that Phillips failed to qualify
as an expert witness in this case (Ibid, 5). The key
findings to support this ruling included Phillips’s failure
to visit the site and the fact that Phillips’s conclusions
were based on karst features on an unrelated site and
study of another site sixty miles from the Louisiana
Energy Services site (Ibid). Citing New Mexico Rules
of Evidence, similar to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed
this ruling, finding that the trial court’s ruling was
not arbitrary and capricious (In re Louisiana Energy
Services, LP, 4-5).
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Conclusions

The four cases cited in this section involve karst expert
testimony in a variety of contexts. However, the cases
present consistent principles. As indicated by these cases,
the courts generally defer to the administrative agency.
To rebut the agency, evidence must be substantial and
show serious error on behalf of the agency. Testimony
should be based on a site-specific investigation, the
findings should be specific, and the evidence should
clearly link impacts to the existence of karst features.
The cases in this section do not extend as far as the
Bos case in requiring expert witnesses to engage in any
and all possible tests. However, In re Louisiana Energy
Services, LP represents a significant ruling in that the
court disqualifies the expert witness. Noting the case
indicates that the expert’s credentials fell short. Instead,
the expert was disqualified due to basing the opinion on
secondary sources instead of a site-specific investigation.
A more accurate analysis of the court’s opinion would
classify the ruling as disqualifying the opinion, not the
expert. If the expert would have done a site-specific
investigation, he would likely have qualified.

Conclusions

The Bos case appears to impose extraordinary
requirements on expert witnesses by discrediting expert
testimony for, among other things, failing to use every
possible test to characterize the site. The ruling remains
unprecedented. However, examination of other cases
involving expert witnesses, along with the pertinent
Federal Rules of Evidence, on karst matters yields useful
principles for expert witnesses and litigants. The Federal
Rules of Evidence require that the expert possess the
requisite expertise, the testimony is based on “sufficient
facts and evidence” and “the product of reliable principles
and methods”, and that these principles and methods are
applied to the facts of the case.
The Bos case illustrates how onerous the burden of proof
may be on a party challenging an agency finding. That
case suggests that the challenger may have to conduct
“every possible study”. On the other hand, Karst
Environmental Education and Protection explicitly
stated that the agency “could have” done more, but
upheld the agency’s investigation as adequate to meet
the agency’s duty to take a “hard look”.
Court interpretations of the rules give greater weight
to expert testimony that is (1) based on site-specific
investigations and data; (2) includes specific and precise
analysis; and (3) clearly links the data to specific
impacts. The Bos case additionally suggests that the
expert conduct every possible test that may aid in the
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investigation, and may be interpreted to require costly,
and even cost-prohibitive tests. However, no other court
has gone that far.
The Bos case also raise troubling questions of whether
the burden of providing expert testimony should be
placed on private citizens, who will rarely be able to
match corporate opponents, or whether state and federal
agencies should be funded to give them the ability to
provide unbiased evidence to courts. Obviously, the cost
of retaining an expert witness may be an insurmountable
burden to many citizen groups. To conduct “every
possible study” would eliminate even more groups from
participation in the judicial process.
Courts also appear to struggle to understand the
complexities of expert testimony relating to karst issues.
Expert witnesses and the litigants who employ them
should keep these issues in mind. Judges and juries must
be educated in order to comprehend and analyze expert
witness testimony relating to karst.
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